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Ohio Northern University
Law Review
Student Case Notes
Johnson v. Guzman Chavez
141 S. Ct. 2271 (2021)
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) authorizes the detention of
individuals placed in removal proceedings due to their unauthorized presence
in the United States.1 While 8 U.S.C. § 1226 specifies the rules of detention
of aliens “pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the
United States,” a different statutory provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1231, governs the
cases of aliens who have already been “ordered removed.”2 These two
sections provide different rules for two distinct groups of noncitizens:
individuals in the first group may be able to be released from detention on
bond by requesting a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226; however, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231 creates a second group for noncitizens who have been ordered
removed and are subject to a ninety-day mandatory detention (“removal
period”) without the right to request a bond hearing.3 This Note focuses on
the question of whether 8 U.S.C. § 1226 or 8 U.S.C. § 1231 applies to
detention of noncitizens with reinstated removal orders who are seeking
withholding-only relief. The Supreme Court addressed this issue in Johnson
v. Guzman Chavez, holding that detention of aliens whose orders of removal
have been reinstated is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231, and not 8 U.S.C. § 1226;
therefore, such aliens are not entitled to bond hearings while seeking
withholding of removal.4
Prior to Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, the federal circuit courts were
divided regarding this question, and different interpretations of the statutory
text led to different outcomes in cases depending on the federal circuit by
1.
2.
3.
4.

8 U.S.C. §§ 1226, 1231 (2012).
Id. §§ 1226(a), 1231(a)(1)(A), 1231(a)(2).
Id. §§ 1226(a), 1231(a)(1)(A), 1231(a)(2).
Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 141 S. Ct. 2271, 2280 (2021).
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which they were adjudicated; thus, there was a pressing need for the Supreme
Court to address this split.5 While the Court’s ruling in Johnson v. Guzman
Chavez resolved the circuit split, by doing so, it narrowed eligibility for
release on bond, excluding detained aliens subject to reinstated orders of
removal seeking withholding-only relief, which will likely spark future
debates among scholars who advocate for a policy change.6
II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Court’s decision in Johnson v. Guzman Chavez focuses on
noncitizens subject to reinstated removal orders that challenged their
detention in federal court requesting that the court order their release or allow
them bond hearings while their withholding-only proceedings were pending.7
To begin, it is important to note the relevant statutory provisions on which
Respondents’ eligibility to request release on bond depends; first, 8 U.S.C. §
1226(a) authorizes the arrest and detention of aliens “pending a decision on
whether the alien is to be removed from the United States,” with 8 U.S.C. §
1226(a)(2) providing that the alien may be released on bond or conditional
parole.8 The second statutory provision is 8 U.S.C. § 1231, which governs
detention and removal of aliens “ordered removed” by an immigration judge,9
and prescribes that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this section,” the
Attorney General10 should remove aliens ordered removed from the country
within ninety days, called the “removal period”, during which “detention is
mandatory.”11 The ninety-day removal period and the prescribed mandatory
detention begin on the date the removal order is “administratively final” or,
if a court orders a stay, on the date of such final order, or on the date the alien
is released from non-immigration related detention or confinement,
whichever of these three dates is later.12 Generally, aliens not removed from
the country within ninety days will be released under supervision.13
However, the default ninety-day removal period can be extended if a specific
provision applies, namely, if the alien does not apply for travel documents in
a timely manner, or takes any action to prevent the removal; removal can also
5. Id. at 2283-84.
6. Id. at 2280.
7. Id. at 2283.
8. Id. at 2280 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)). See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1236.1(c)(8), 236.1(c)(8) (2016)
(providing that in order to be released on bond, the alien must be able to prove that his or her “release
would not pose a danger to property or persons, and that the alien is likely to appear for any future
proceeding”).
9. Guzman Chavez, 141 S. Ct. at 2280.
10. Id. at 2280, n.1 (noting that Congress has also authorized the Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) to enforce the INA).
11. Id. at 2281 (quoting 8 U.S.C. §§ 1231(a)(1)(A), 1231(a)(2)).
12. Guzman Chavez, 141 S. Ct. at 2281. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B).
13. Guzman Chavez, 141 S. Ct. at 2282. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3).
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be stayed if it is not “practicable or proper,” or the alien’s testimony is needed
in a prosecution; last, detention of inadmissible aliens, removable criminal
aliens, or other aliens posing “a risk to the community or unlikely to comply
with the order of removal” may be extended beyond the ninety-day period, or
they can be granted supervised release; in these cases, extended detention is
called the “post-removal-period.”14
Removal and detention of individuals who have already been removed or
left voluntarily based on prior removal orders and later returned to the country
illegally are governed by the rules of expedited removal, providing that “. . .
the prior order of removal is reinstated from its original date and is not subject
to being reopened or reviewed, the alien is not eligible and may not apply for
any relief under this chapter, and the alien shall be removed under the prior
order at any time after the reentry.”15 Nevertheless, the alien may seek
statutory withholding of removal which, if granted, prohibits removal to a
specific country if “the alien’s life or freedom would be threatened in that
country because of the alien’s race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion;” or, the alien may apply for
withholding based on The United Nations Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), which
bars removal to a country where the alien would be subjected to torture.16
Respondents were foreign citizens removed from the United States based
on valid orders of removal who later reentered the country illegally because
of their fear of remaining in their home country; thus, their prior orders of
removal were reinstated according to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5).17 Respondents
applied for withholding of removal, and they were able to prove reasonable
fear of persecution or torture; consequently, the cases were referred to an
immigration judge to decide whether Respondent’s were eligible for
withholding-only relief.18 As Respondents were held in detention, they
applied for release on bond; however, the government denied their request,
contending that Respondents were not entitled to bond hearings because they
were “ordered removed” and detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1231, which
prescribes mandatory detention and does not allow requests for bond
hearings.19 Respondents, in two groups, filed habeas petitions in The United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia,20 both seeking a
declaration that they were detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226, and not 8 U.S.C.
14. Guzman Chavez, 141 S. Ct. at 2281. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1231(a)(1)(C), 1231(c)(2)(A), 1231(a)(6).
15. Guzman Chavez, 141 S. Ct. at 2282 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5)).
16. Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A)) (citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16-17, 1208.16–17).
17. Guzman Chavez, 141 S. Ct. at 2283.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Romero v. Evans, 280 F. Supp. 3d 835, 836-37 (E.D. Va. 2017); Diaz v. Hott, 297 F. Supp 3d
618, 620 (E.D. Va. 2018) (respondents in this second group also filed for class action certification).
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§ 1231, and also asking the court to grant an injunction to allow their bond
hearings according to 8 U.S.C. § 1226.21
The district court granted summary judgment for Respondents in both
cases,22 holding that they were detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226; thus, they
were entitled to bond hearings while they were awaiting the disposition of
their withholding-only applications.23 The district court found that “until
withholding-only proceedings are complete, a decision has not been made on
whether they will in fact be removed from the United States,” and that the
government lacks “the present and final legal authority” to remove
Respondents; therefore, the “administrative process is not complete” and the
reinstated orders of removal are not final, even if the issue of removability
has already been decided.24
The government appealed both decisions, and the cases were
consolidated for appeal.25 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit affirmed the lower court’s judgment, holding that under 8 U.S.C. §
1226, Respondents were entitled to bond hearings, reasoning that the removal
period, which requires mandatory detention, does not begin until the
government has the actual legal authority to execute the removal after the
withholding-only proceedings are over.26 The Supreme Court granted writ of
certiorari to resolve the circuit split and determine whether 8 U.S.C. § 1226
or 8 U.S.C. § 1231 governs the detention of aliens with reinstated orders of
removal while seeking withholding-only proceedings and, ultimately,
whether such noncitizens are entitled to bond hearings or not.27
III.

THE COURT’S DECISION AND RATIONALE
A. Majority Opinion by Justice Alito

Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to footnote
four,28 joined by Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Kavanaugh and Barrett.29
21. Guzman Chavez, 141 S. Ct. at 2283.
22. Romero, 280 F. Supp. 3d at 849 (granting motion for summary judgment for noncitizen
petitioners); Diaz, 297 F. Supp. 3d at 628 (granting motion to certify class and motion for summary
judgment for noncitizen petitioners).
23. Guzman Chavez, 141 S. Ct. at 2283.
24. Guzman Chavez v. Hott, 940 F.3d 867, 871-72 (quoting Romero, 280 F. Supp. 3d at 846).
25. Id. at 872.
26. Id. at 882, 873.
27. Guzman Chavez, 141 S. Ct. at 2284.
28. Id. at 2280, n.4 (providing that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review the case). See
also Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138. S. Ct. 830, 840-41 (2018) (plurality opinion) (holding that the Court has
jurisdiction as Respondents are only challenging their detention without bail, they “are not asking for
review of an order of removal; they are not challenging the decision to detain them in the first place or to
seek removal; and they are not even challenging any part of the process by which their removability will
be determined”).
29. Guzman Chavez, 141 S. Ct. at 2280.
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The Court held that the detention of aliens whose removal orders were
reinstated are governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231, and not 8 U.S.C. § 1226; thus,
such aliens are not entitled to bond hearings while seeking withholding-only
relief.30 Therefore, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit.31
To begin, in Part II of the opinion, Justice Alito addressed the two most
significant issues of the case by concluding that Respondents were “ordered
removed,” and their reinstated removal orders were “administratively
final.”32 First, turning to the plain meaning of the statutory text, the Court
held that, when an alien is removed and later reenters the country without
authorization, “the prior order of removal is reinstated from its original date
and is not subject to being reopened or reviewed;” thus, Respondents’
removal can be executed at any time.33
Respondents argued that during the withholding-only process, it might
be determined that they cannot be removed to the country specified in their
reinstated orders of removal.34 To refute Respondent’s’ argument that their
removal was still pending due to the inseparable nature of the two questions
of “whether” or “where” they would be removed to, the Court emphasized
the “country-specific” nature of the withholding-only relief.35 The Court
reasoned that withholding-only relief impacts solely the country where the
alien will be removed to; thus, it does not invalidate or modify the prior
removal order or the aliens’ removability.36 Referring to its prior holdings in
Nasrallah v. Barr37 and INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre,38 the Court found that
withholding-only relief prohibits removing the alien to a specific country, but
nothing prevents removal to another country.39 The Court further explained
that reinstated orders of removal and withholding-only proceedings are two
separate procedures; both require a separate order, but the first one is final
and is no longer subject to changes once it is reinstated.40 Additionally, the
Court noted that the special statutory provisions in 8. U.S.C § 123141
30. Id.
31. Id. at 2292.
32. Id. at 2284.
33. Id. at 2284 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5)).
34. Guzman Chavez, 141 S. Ct. at 2285.
35. Id. at 2285-86.
36. Id. at 2286.
37. Nasrallah v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1683, 1691 (2020) (holding that granting CAT order means that
the noncitizen is not to be removed to a specific country at least until the conditions change in that country;
however, the noncitizen can still be removed to any other country at any time).
38. INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 419 (1999) (holding that as opposed to asylum, which
allows the noncitizen to remain in the United States, withholding-only relief only prohibits removing the
alien to a particular country).
39. Guzman Chavez, 141 S. Ct. at 2286.
40. Id. at 2297-88.
41. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1231(a)(1)(C), 1231(c)(2)(A), 1231(a)(3).
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governing the extension of the removal period, stay of removal, or supervised
release, allow the government time to address and overcome possible
obstacles of removal beyond the initial ninety-day removal period in order to
execute removal of aliens “ordered removed.”42 To further support this
interpretation, the Court revisited its ruling in Zadvydas v. Davis, which
addressed a similar issue due to the government’s inability to find a country
to which the aliens could be removed.43 In Zadvydas v. Davis, the Court,
instead of applying 8 U.S.C. § 1226, held that aliens detained under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231 may be released if their removal cannot be executed in the foreseeable
future, so that they will not be detained indefinitely.44 Therefore, the Court
rejected the contention that until the government located a country to which
to remove Respondents, their removability remained pending under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226, because if both questions of “where” and “whether” they will be
removed were governed by that same section until the issue of finding a
removal country is resolved, then explicitly allowing aliens detained under 8
U.S.C. § 1231 to seek release based on prolonged detention would not make
sense.45
Next, turning to the question of the finality of the reinstated removal
order, the Court held that, based on the plain meaning of the statutory text,
the legislature’s intent was to consider the order “administratively” final once
the agency’s process comes to its end; namely, when the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) reviews the case or the time for seeking review
by BIA has expired, and unless a court orders a stay, Respondents can be
removed, with no opportunity to request a review of their reinstated order of
removal and regardless of the withholding-only proceedings.46 For further
support, the Court turned to Nasrallah v. Barr,47 in which case, analogously
to the present case, noncitizens were ordered removed and pursued
withholding relief under CAT; and the Court held that the order granting CAT
relief is not a final order of removal, and it does not “affect the validity of the
final order of removal,” as they are two different orders.48

42. Guzman Chavez, 141 S. Ct. at 2286.
43. Id. at 2287.
44. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (limiting the post-removal detention to a duration
reasonably necessary for the alien’s removal, and establishing that after six months, the alien can seek
release from detention if there is no significant likelihood that the alien can be removed in the foreseeable
future).
45. Guzman Chavez, 141 S. Ct. at 2287.
46. Id. at 2284-85.
47. Nasrallah, 140 S. Ct. at 1691 (holding that a final order of removal is an order finding the alien
deportable, or ordering deportation of the alien; therefore, granting withholding relief under CAT is not a
final order of removal).
48. Guzman Chavez, 141 S. Ct. at 2288 (quoting Nasrallah,140 S. Ct. at 1691).
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Next, the Court addressed Respondents’ argument that, based on the
“except clause,”49 the removal period had not started, and that they were not
removable until the withholding-only process was pending because DHS
would not have been able to actually remove them within ninety days.50 The
Court interpreted the clause as allowing an extension to the ninety-day default
length of the removal period, as opposed to “triggering” the start date of such
period.51 Accordingly, it extends the time allowed to complete the removal
process, providing that “DHS is not required to remove the alien within 90
days” if any of the special provisions apply, such as if the alien fails to secure
travel documents in a timely manner or tries to prevent removal; also,
removal can be stayed if it is not practicable or proper, or the alien’s
testimony is needed in a prosecution; finally, detention of certain
inadmissible or criminal aliens, or other aliens posing certain risks can be
extended.52
The Court next turned to the structure of the statute and noted that the
placement of both provisions governing the detention of noncitizens “ordered
removed” and withholding-only relief in 8 U.S.C. § 1231 confirms that the
detention of aliens subject to withholding-only proceedings should be
governed by the same section.53 Furthermore, the order of the sections of Part
IV of the INA are structured to provide a timeline for the removal process,
from the arrival of aliens to removal, which shows that 8 U.S.C. § 1226
applies when the decision on removability itself is pending, but once it is
decided, 8 U.S.C. § 1231 applies, and “the alien cannot go back in time, so to
speak, to 8 U.S.C. § 1226.”54
To continue, the Court turned to analyzing Congress’s intention and the
policy reasons behind providing two distinct sections to govern the detention
of two different groups of aliens.55 First, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 governs detention
of aliens that pose a lighter flight risk as they still have a chance to remain in
the country, while 8 U.S.C. § 1231 applies to individuals already ordered to
be removed who pose a greater flight risk due to the fact that they are likely
inadmissible, and they can only apply for withholding-only relief.56
Additionally, as aliens in this second group are already in violation of U.S.
immigration laws because they were once removed and then came back
49. 8 U.S.C. §1231(a)(1)(A) (providing that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this section, when
an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General shall remove the alien from the United States within a
period of 90 days.”).
50. Guzman Chavez, 141 S. Ct. at 2288.
51. Id.
52. Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A)).
53. Guzman Chavez, 141 S. Ct. at 2289.
54. Id. at 2289-90 (quoting Guzman Chavez, 940 F.3d at 888 (Richardson, J., dissenting)).
55. Id. at 2290.
56. Id.
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illegally, “they are less likely to comply with the reinstated order;” thus, it is
reasonable that Congress would provide more strict rules for their detention
and removal.57
In response to Respondents’ remaining argument that the government did
not have the necessary legal authority to remove them as long as the
withholding-only proceeding was ongoing, the Court first held that the
withholding-only proceeding was not an “impediment” that must have been
resolved before the removal period started, nor did it affect the government’s
full authority to remove Respondents to any other country.58 Second, the
Court also rejected the argument that because of the length of the
withholding-only proceeding, which requires a longer time to conclude than
ninety days, 8 U.S.C. § 1231 should not apply to aliens pursuing withholdingonly relief, and found that the statute addresses this issue by authorizing DHS
to release the alien under supervision or otherwise extend the time by
allowing for a post-removal-period.59
Therefore, the majority held that Respondents’ detention is governed by
8 U.S.C. § 1231, and they are not entitled to bond hearings.60
B. Concurring Opinion by Justice Thomas
Justice Thomas concurred except for footnote four and concurred in the
judgment, joined by Justice Gorsuch.61 In the short concurring opinion,
Justice Thomas concluded that the Court did not have jurisdiction to review
this case.62 He explained that, under 8. U.S.C § 1252(b)(9), the Court has
jurisdiction over “questions of law and fact . . . arising from any action taken
or proceeding brought to remove an alien” only when reviewing a final order
of removal or when exercising its jurisdiction expressly granted by another
provision in 8. U.S.C § 1252, and that Respondents’ case did not fall under
either of these two categories that would enable judicial review .63 Justice
Thomas, referring to his previous concurring opinion in Jennings v
Rodriguez, reasoned that challenging detention without bond and
withholding-only relief claims are part “of the deportation process that
necessarily serve[s] the purpose of ensuring an alien’s removal;” therefore,
the restriction limiting judicial review to final orders applies.64 Thus, Justice
Thomas concluded that the lower court’s judgment should have been vacated
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id.
Guzman Chavez, 141 S. Ct. at 2290-91.
Id. at 2291.
Id. at 2280.
Id. at 2292 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id.
Guzman Chavez, 141 S. Ct. at 2292 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting 8. U.S.C § 1252(b)(9)).
Id. (quoting Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 854 (Thomas, J., concurring) (plurality opinion)).
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and remanded due to lack of jurisdiction; otherwise, except for footnote four,
he agreed with the majority’s opinion.65
C. Dissenting Opinion by Justice Breyer
Justice Breyer dissented, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan.66
Justice Breyer agreed that the Court had jurisdiction to review the case;
however, he disagreed with the majority’s opinion that the case was governed
by 8 U.S.C. § 1231; instead, he concluded that 8 U.S.C. § 1226 should have
applied, and Respondents should have been entitled to bond hearings.67 The
dissent questioned the majority’s interpretation that Congress’s intention was
to deny bond hearings and to subject noncitizens who have reasonable fear of
persecution or torture in their designated country of removal to months or
possibly years of detention while their withholding application is pending,
when only a small percentage of aliens granted withholding-only relief are
actually removed to an alternative country.68 Further disagreeing with the
majority, Justice Breyer concluded that reinstated orders of removal are not
administratively final, and, until a decision is made on the withholding-only
application, the removal period does not begin and mandatory detention
without release on bond is not applicable.69
In Part II of his dissent, Justice Breyer continued his argument that the
withholding-only relief can ultimately be seen as a modification of the prior
removal order by changing the designated country of removal.70 Thus, he
reasoned that the ninety-day removal period should not apply to these cases;
instead, a better conclusion is that the reinstated removal order is not
administratively final until the agency’s process is fully completed, and all
“rights or obligations have been determined . . . from which legal
consequences will flow,” including the decision on eligibility for
withholding-only relief.71
In addition, Justice Breyer also challenged the Court’s interpretation of
the “except clause,” arguing that another possible reading of the clause is that
it authorizes the government to “exempt the removal procedure altogether,”
instead of simply “extending” the length of the ninety-day removal period if
a special provision is applicable.72

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.
Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2293.
Guzman Chavez, 141 S. Ct. at 2294-95 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2296.
Id. at 2297.
Id. (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 178 (1997)).
Id. at 2296-97.
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ANALYSIS
A. Introduction

Prior to Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, the federal circuit courts were in
disagreement about whether noncitizens facing detention based on reinstated
orders of removal are eligible to request bond hearings while their
withholding applications are pending.73 This ambiguity not only sparked
heated debates, but also stood in the way of the uniform application of this
area of immigration law.74 In Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, the Supreme Court
resolved the circuit split by holding that detention of aliens subject to
reinstated orders of removal in withholding-only proceedings is governed by
8. U.S.C § 1231; thus, such aliens are not entitled to bond hearings.75
With its decision, the Court set a precedent for the federal courts,
preventing future inconsistent judgments that provide different protections to
detained immigrants based on the jurisdiction’s approach.76 However, the
long-term effects of the decision will likely subject Johnson v. Guzman
Chavez to criticism, as it significantly narrowed the eligibility to apply for
release on bond, excluding aliens who were removed from or left the United
States based on a prior removal order and later returned illegally, which can
lead to their prolonged detention.77
This analysis argues that the Court interpreted the text of the statute in
alignment with Congress’s intent to treat “high-risk” individuals differently
and came to a proper conclusion.78 In support of that, the following
discussion will concentrate on the main questions raised by the decision,
namely, the finality of reinstated removal orders and future effects.
B. Discussion
i. Circuit Split Resolved: Reinstated Removal Orders Are
Administratively Final
Prior to Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, the split among the circuit courts,
caused by a lack of any Supreme Court precedents regarding whether
noncitizens subject to reinstated orders of removal are entitled to bond
hearings, resulted in different outcomes based on the approach the
73. Guzman Chavez, 141 S. Ct. at 2283-84 (majority opinion). See also David L. Hudson Jr., Are
Noncitizens in Pending Withholding-Only Immigration Proceedings Entitled to a Bond Hearing for
Possible Release? (19-897), 48 PREVIEW U.S. SUP. CT. CAS. 3 (2021).
74. Guzman Chavez, 141 S. Ct. at 2283-84.
75. Id. at 2280.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 2295 (Breyer, J., dissenting). See also Hudson Jr., supra note 73, at 5.
78. Guzman Chavez, 141 S. Ct. at 2290 (majority opinion).
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jurisdiction followed because some courts allowed bond hearings for certain
noncitizens while others denied the same for individuals in the same
situation.79 At the center of the disagreement stood one main issue: whether
reinstated orders of removal are final orders of removal.80 While the Second,
Fourth, and Tenth Circuits held that reinstated removal orders were not final
orders and 8 U.S.C. § 1226 applied when an alien was seeking withholding
of removal, the Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits found that reinstated removal
orders were final under 8 U.S.C. § 1231 and did not allow bond hearings to
these noncitizens.81
The Supreme Court was faced with the exact same question in Johnson
v. Guzman Chavez.82 The Court held that reinstated orders of removal are
final orders, and by doing so, narrowed the group of noncitizens eligible to
release on bond, subjecting the rest to longer detention while their
withholding-only application is pending.83 This raises the difficult question
Justice Breyer also asked in his dissenting opinion: “Does the statutory
provision’s language nonetheless require the majority’s result?”84
While there are conflicting opinions on this issue, with arguments on both
sides, the majority’s opinion provided a sound legal analysis and reasoning
that arguably support the conclusion that the Court’s decision relies on a
faithful interpretation of the statutory text, as it stands today. The INA does
not provide a clear statutory provision or terminology that would
unambiguously describe what constitutes a final order though it refers to it
repeatedly, for example by stating that the removal period starts when the
order of removal is “administratively final.”85 While the INA prescribes that
79. Id. at 2283-84. See also Hudson Jr., supra note 73, at 5.
80. Guzman Chavez, 141 S. Ct. at 2284.
81. Compare Guerra v. Shanahan, 831 F.3d 59, 64 (2d Cir. 2016) (holding that reinstated order of
removal is not final while withholding-only proceeding is pending; thus, under 8 U.S.C. § 1226, Guerra is
entitled to a bond hearing), and Guzman Chavez, 940 F.3d at 867 (holding that 8 U.S.C. § 1226 governs
detention of aliens in withholding-only proceedings; thus, they are entitled to bond hearings), and LunaGarcia v. Holder, 777 F.3d 1182, 1186 (10th Cir. 2015) (holding that reinstated order of removal is not
final until the disposition of the reasonable fear proceedings) with Guerrero-Sanchez v. Warden York
County Prison, 905 F.3d 208, 211 (3d Cir. 2018) (holding that reinstated order of removal is
administratively final and 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) governs the alien’s detention while seeking withholdingonly proceedings; but allowing bond hearing on “alternative grounds” due to prolonged detention based
on 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6)), and Martinez v. Larose, 986 F.3d 555, 557, 563-64 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding
that reinstated order of removal is administratively final; thus, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) applies to aliens in
withholding-only proceedings, also denying right to a bond hearing), and Padilla-Ramirez v. Bible, 882
F.3d 826, 832 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that reinstated order of removal is administratively final, and
detention in withholding-only proceedings is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)).
82. Guzman Chavez, 141 S. Ct. at 2280.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 2295 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
85. Jesi J. Carlson, Patrick J. Glen & Kohsei Ugumori, Finality and Judicial Review Under the
Immigration and Nationality Act: Jurisprudential Review and Proposal for Reform, 49 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 635, 644 (2016).
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an order of deportation “concluding that the alien is deportable or ordering
deportation” is final, it does not provide a clear answer of whether it is
applicable to reinstated orders of removal and other final orders of removal.86
As “there are potentially competing conceptions of finality under the INA
and its regulations,” which differentiate between finality regarding executing
an order and reviewing it, it might not be possible to answer this question by
providing a single definition.87 The Second Circuit in Guerra v. Shanahan
and the Fourth Circuit in Guzman Chavez v. Hott rejected the idea of different
“tiers of finality,” and relied on the administration law principle that finality
requires agency action which is the “consummation of the agency’s
decisionmaking process,” requiring the adjudication of all questions,
including the withholding-only application.88 The Ninth Circuit, on the other
hand, held in Padilla-Ramirez v. Bible that the agency concluded its process
by making a decision on the removability; thus, the reinstated removal order
is final for detention purposes, although it is not final in the context of judicial
review concerning the withholding-only relief.89
In the absence of a prior Supreme Court precedent on point, the Court
used the statutory text and structure to infer Congress’s intent.90 Justice Alito
acknowledged that there is not a statutory definition available for the
expression “administratively final”; however, he concluded that the question
is more straightforward, because, by adding the word “administratively,”
Congress made it clear that courts should interpret it as the end of “the
agency’s review proceedings,” instead of referring to it in the context of
judicial review.91 In other words, the removal order is final after the BIA
reviews the order or the period provided for appeal expires.92 Justice Breyer
86. Id. at 641-42 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(A)).
87. Id. at 647, 685.
88. Guerra, 831 F.3d at 63-64 (quoting Bennett, 520 U.S. at 178); Guzman Chavez, 940 F.3d at
881.
89. Padilla-Ramirez, 882 F.3d at 836.
90. Guzman Chavez, 141 S. Ct. at 2284 (majority opinion).
91. Id. See also STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & DAVID B. THRONSON, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE
LAW AND POLICY 874-75 (7th ed. 2019) (explaining that in order to request judicial review, the noncitizen
“must first exhaust all administrative remedies, . . . including appeal to the BIA,” and “the removal order
must be administratively final;” also, unless the court orders a stay, the noncitizen can be removed from
the country before the court reviews the petition); Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Rise of Speed
Deportation and the Role of Discretion, 5 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1, 8 (2015) (“filing a petition for review
does not automatically ‘stay’ a person’s deportation, so DHS can execute a removal order notwithstanding
a timely filed petition for review”).
92. Guzman Chavez, 141 S. Ct. at 2285. See 8 C.F.R. § 1241.1 (2016) (providing that an order of
removal becomes final when (a) the BIA dismisses the appeal; (b) the alien waives appeal; (c) the time for
appeal expires without the alien filing an appeal; (d) if certified to the BIA or Attorney General, on the
date of the subsequent decision ordering removal; (e) immediately after an immigration judge orders an
alien removed in the alien’s absence; (f) if an alternate order of removal in regards to a grant of voluntary
departure is issued by an immigration judge, when the alien overstays the voluntary departure period, or
fails to post the required bond; and if the alien files an appeal, the order becomes final when an order of
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argued the opposite, pointing to Bennett v. Spear, that found that in order for
the agency’s decision to become final, it must be the “consummation of the
agency’s decisionmaking process,” from which “rights or obligations have
been determined” or “legal consequences will flow.”93 Justice Breyer also
reasoned that seeking withholding relief, if granted, can modify the prior
removal order by changing the country of removal originally provided in the
removal order.94 This clearly shows an unresolvable disagreement between
the majority’s and the dissent’s points of view: the majority held that once
the removal order is reinstated, the agency’s decision-making procedures are
concluded, and there is “nothing left” but to execute the prior order stating
that the alien is to be removed, while the dissent argued that the agency’s
procedure is not final until all related questions are adjudicated, including the
withholding-only relief.95
While the statute does not provide much clarity regarding this question,
Justice Alito provided a more persuasive argument to defend the Court’s
standpoint, emphasizing that, when the order of removal is reinstated from its
original date, it cannot be later reopened or reviewed, and the alien shall be
removed based on the reinstated order any time after reentering the United
States.96 Nothing indicates that the removal order, as the ultimate decision
regarding the alien’s removability, sufficiently determining the rights,
obligations, and other legal consequences resulting from the removal
proceedings at its conclusion, once it is being reinstated, loses its finality
during the withholding-only process.97 Consequently, granting withholdingonly relief itself does not affect the reinstated order of removal, as the
immigration judge is not reviewing the prior removal order, nor the alien’s
removability; thus, the government still has the authority to remove the alien
to any other country.98 Accordingly, the only issue discussed during the
withholding-only proceedings is to determine where the alien will be
removed, and if the relief is granted, it only concerns a particular country
where the alien cannot be sent.99 Most importantly, the Court’s opinion
correctly notes that the removal order concluding that the alien is to be
removal is issued by the BIA or the Attorney General, or upon overstay of the voluntary departure period
granted or reinstated by the BIA or the Attorney General).
93. Guzman Chavez, 141 S. Ct. at 2297. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Bennett, 520 U.S. at 178)).
94. Id.
95. Guzman Chavez, 141 S. Ct. at 2285, 2297.
96. Id. at 2284 (majority opinion). See also LEGOMSKY & THRONSON, supra note 91, at 1039
(noting that the government could initiate new removal proceedings when noncitizens reenter the country
illegally on the grounds that they are inadmissible and they are in violation of the immigration laws;
however, the new process is time-consuming, while the prior removal order can be reinstated within a
significantly shorter time).
97. Guzman Chavez, 141 S. Ct. at 2285.
98. Id. at 2285-86.
99. Id.
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removed from the United States, and the order granting withholding-only
relief, are two separate orders, which seems logical considering that in order
to make the second decision, there must be a determination regarding the
removal of the alien first “that can be withheld.”100 In sum, little support has
been provided to show that an order of removal, once it is reinstated, would
lose its finality during later proceedings.101 On the contrary, as the Court held
in Nasrallah v. Bar, a final order of removal is an order “concluding that the
alien is deportable or ordering deportation,” and the CAT order only means
that the alien cannot be removed to a specific country, and definitely “not that
a CAT order is the same as, or affects the validity of, a final order of
removal.”102
Although the Court’s reasoning is convincing, as Justice Breyer
explained, it is not completely without shortcomings, arguably, because of
the lack of clear definitions in the INA.103 The dissent pointed out that the
majority’s interpretation is flawed because it can result in cases where the
reinstated removal order becomes administratively final long before it is
reinstated during the withholding-only proceedings.104 Beyond a doubt, this
creates uncertainties regarding the ninety-day removal period, such as
whether it starts on the date of the original order, then terminates, and starts
over again when the removal order is reinstated, or even if it is applicable at
all; thus, these unanswered questions suggest that the rules of reinstated
orders of removal and withholding-only relief are not completely in accord
with each other.105 The Court did not elaborate on these specific concerns;
however, it did reason that, if the withholding-only proceedings cannot be
concluded in ninety days, the “except clause” authorizes “post-removal”
detention; thus, these questions do not essentially affect the issue of finality
as the removal period can be longer than ninety days while the withholdingonly process is pending.106 While it is a possible interpretation, Justice Breyer
100. Id. at 2287-88 (quoting Matter of I–S & C–S–, 24 I & N Dec. 432-433 (BIA 2008)). See also
Wadhia, supra note 91, at 13 (emphasizing that “a grant of withholding of removal requires an explicit
order of removal, further indicating that, as a legal matter, this form of protection operates as a restriction
on where a person may be removed and not as permission to remain in the United States indefinitely”).
101. Guzman Chavez, 141 S. Ct. at 2288.
102. Nasrallah, 140 S. Ct. at 1691 (quoting 8. U.S.C § 1101(a)(47)(A)).
103. Guzman Chavez, 141 S. Ct. at 2297 (Breyer, J., dissenting). See also LEGOMSKY & THRONSON,
supra note 91, at 875 (noting that under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1), the alien “shall” be detained during the
removal period; however, it also indicates that that “‘[u]nder no circumstances during the removal period
shall the Attorney General release’ certain . . . removable noncitizens;” therefore, it is unclear “whether
the word ‘shall’ is to be taken literally”); Stephen H. Legomsky, The Detention of Aliens: Theories, Rules,
and Discretion, 30. U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 531, 534 n.16 (1999) (raising the question of whether
this second part means that under certain circumstances noncitizens “who have been found inadmissible
or deportable on other grounds” (criminal and security related reasons) “may be released”).
104. Guzman Chavez, 141 S. Ct. at 2297 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 2288-89 (majority opinion). See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A).
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questioned whether it is the only one, and why it cannot mean exempting
removal itself.107
The structure of the INA, however, as the Court reasoned, provides some
clarity on Congress’s intent; because the “except clause” is located under the
subsection “Removal period,” it is more likely that it relates to the length and
possible extension of the removal period, rather than providing that an alien
may not be removed at all.108 Arguably, the interpretation of extending the
removal period to allow the government to resolve issues preventing removal
makes more sense than asserting that aliens subject to reinstated removal
orders can escape removal completely because the decision of which country
they will be removed to is still pending.109 The structure of the INA provides
further support to this argument, since the rules of reinstated removal orders
are in 8 U.S.C. § 1231, which governs the detention of aliens “ordered
removed”; thus, the explanation seems logical that this includes all aliens
whose removability was once decided by a removal order.110
In sum, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of administrative finality of
reinstated orders of removal provided long-awaited guidelines to federal
courts to eliminate inconsistent judgments; however, as the dissent pointed
out, the Court’s opinion left a few unresolved questions regarding whether
and how the rules of reinstated orders of removal should apply with full force
in withholding-only proceedings.111 Instead of leaving it to the courts to
address these issues, a better solution is to resolve them in the form of a
statutory reform, by accepting a specialized definition of finality for purposes
of judicial review, adhering to a bright line rule that a decision is final when
all administrative proceedings are completed, while declaring that 8 U.S.C.
1101(a)(47), which provides that a final order for detention purposes is a
decision “concluding that the alien is deportable or ordering deportation,”112
should be applied to administrative finality.113 Ultimately, resolving the
remaining statutory ambiguity this way would require legislative action by
Congress.114

107. Guzman Chavez, 141 S. Ct. at 2295-97 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 2289 (majority opinion).
109. Id. at 2288.
110. Id. at 2289.
111. Id. at 2297 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
112. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(A) (“The term ‘order of deportation’ means the order of the special
inquiry officer, or other such administrative officer to whom the Attorney General has delegated the
responsibility for determining whether an alien is deportable, concluding that the alien is deportable or
ordering deportation.”).
113. Carlson et al., supra note 85, at 685.
114. Id. at 687.

Published by DigitalCommons@ONU, 2021

15

Ohio Northern University Law Review, Vol. 48 [2021], Iss. 1, Art. 5

164

OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

ii. Policy Considerations, Due Process Concerns, and Impact on
Future Cases
The Court’s decision restricts the ability of noncitizens who are detained
and subject to reinstated orders of removal to be released while awaiting the
adjudication of their withholding-only applications.115 Because the Court’s
ruling clearly denies them the opportunity to request bond hearings, it raises
a concern that such aliens will now face prolonged detention.116
The question of extended or indefinite detention of noncitizens subject to
reinstated removal orders has raised concerns and debates long before the
Court decided Johnson v. Guzman Chavez.117 By emphasizing the pressing
need for unanimity and clear guidelines in this area of immigration law, one
suggestion was that Congress should make legislative changes to ensure the
unanimous application of the law.118 It has also been proposed that, in order
to protect individuals who fear persecution or torture in their designated
country of removal, courts should hold that reinstated orders of removal are
not considered final orders of removal while the withholding-only application
is pending.119 In spite of the suggestions that the best course of action is that
courts consistently hold that such noncitizens are entitled to bond hearings to
avoid inconsistent application of the law which leads to injustice and results
in unnecessary detention of individuals, the Court in Johnson v. Guzman
Chavez went the opposite way.120 This raises the question: how does the
Court’s decision, by setting the precedent of denying bond hearings to aliens
in withholding-only proceedings, affect due process considerations in future
cases? 121
As Justice Breyer concluded in his dissent, the Court’s decision will
likely subject noncitizens in withholding-only proceedings to prolonged
detention, as they will not be able to obtain release on bond.122 While aliens
115. Guzman Chavez, 141 S. Ct. at 2280 (majority opinion).
116. Id. at 2295 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
117. Jennifer Lee Koh, Removal in the Shadows of Immigration Court, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 206
(2017).
118. John Gavin, Note, Finally Freed of Infinitely Detained? The Need for a Clear Standard of
Finality for Reinstated Orders of Removal, 59. B.C. L. REV. 2437, 2468 (2018).
119. Id.
120. Mohamed T. Hegazi, Comment, To Be or Not to Be Detained: Why Reinstated Removal Orders
During Withholding-only Proceedings Are Not Administratively Final, 15 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV. 57,
74 (2019); Guzman Chavez, 141 S. Ct. at 2280.
121. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693 (holding that “once an alien enters the country, the legal
circumstance changes, for the Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States,
including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent”). See also
Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 SUP
CT. REV. 255, 259, 298 (1984) (procedural due process is an exception to Congress’s absolute power to
regulate immigration, and “aliens undergoing deportation proceedings are entitled to procedural due
process”).
122. Guzman Chavez, 141 S. Ct. 2295 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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were able to request bond hearings in some jurisdictions before, as a result of
Johnson v. Guzman Chavez they are now also ineligible to do so.123 As
Justice Breyer stressed, the Court’s decision to deny detained noncitizens
who fled their country in fear of persecution or torture the opportunity to be
released on bond and incarcerating them in immigration detention facilities
where they have very little or no access to essential legal services to pursue
their claims has far reaching consequences.124 For instance, Justice Breyer
pointed to studies showing that adjudication of the withholding-only
proceedings is a lengthy process, and, as a result, aliens granted withholding
relief in most cases remain in the United States.125 The extended time of
detention in these cases brings up more concerns, such as the increasing
number of individuals held in detention centers, the costs of detention, and,
last but not least, the conditions and restrictions aliens are faced with in
detention centers, including lack of access to legal help.126 As Justice Breyer
also noted, this might be the reason why they are often unsuccessful in
pursuing their claims.127
In addition, there are other serious implications and due process concerns
attached to the finality of reinstated orders of removal.128 First, reinstating
the prior order takes only a short time,129 providing the noncitizen with
123. See, e.g., Guerra, 831 F.3d at 64 (holding that Guerra is entitled to a bond hearing); Guzman
Chavez, 940 F.3d at 882 (allowing bond hearings for aliens subject to reinstated orders of removal in
withholding-only proceedings).
124. Guzman Chavez, 141 S. Ct. at 2294-95 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 2294-95 (stating that according to data provided by ACLU in 2015, average detention
length was 114 days; however, in case an appeal, it was in the range of 301 to 447 days).
126. See Farrin R. Anello, Due Process and Temporal Limits on Mandatory Immigration Detention,
65 HASTINGS L.J. 363, 367 (2014) (contending that “detainees are confined in county jails and other
facilities that are designed for corrections purposes,” facing “unduly restrictive, corrections-like
conditions, isolated from their families and communities, with inadequate access to law libraries and other
services, and often intermingled with criminal inmates”); Legomsky, supra note 103, at 532, 541-42, 549
(emphasizing that while detention prevents detained noncitizens from absconding or endangering the
public, long-term detention entails serious costs for both detained individuals and society (limitation on
noncitizens’ liberty and their ability to work, travel, or socialize, cruelty and unnecessary expenses of
detention, limited access to legal services, documents, and other resources); also noting that the costs of
mandatory detention could likely be avoided by individualized case-by-case adjudication).
127. Guzman Chavez, 141 S. Ct. at 2295 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
128. Koh, supra note 117, at 206. See also Jennifer Stepp Breen & Stephen Yale-Loehr,
Reinstatement of Removal: New Developments in a Growing Form of Removal, 19 BENDER’S IMMIGR.
BULL. 02 (Apr. 15, 2014) (a noncitizen facing reinstatement of removal “no longer has the right to a
hearing before an IJ, has no right to develop a record, and has no right to counsel.” Nevertheless,
reinstatement of the prior removal order is a common process which accounts for a large percentage of the
total number of removals.); Jennifer Lee Koh, When Shadow Removals Collide: Searching for Solutions
to the Legal Black Holes Created by Expedited Removal and Reinstatement, 24 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL.
01 (Feb. 1, 2019) (reinstatements make up a significant number of all removals, and because of the lack
of statute of limitations, there is no time limit for reinstating the prior removal order).
129. See 8. C.F.R. § 241.8(a)(1)-(3) (2016) (providing that if the immigration officer determines
that (1) the alien is subject to a prior removal order, (2) the alien is in fact the person who was previously
removed or left the country voluntarily, and (3) the alien reentered the country unlawfully, provides an
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minimal opportunity and no “waiting period” to contest the immigration
officer’s decision.”130 Second, the alien has no opportunity to request
correction of possible errors in the original removal order, as it is not subject
to review, and, by ruling out the chance to apply for any relief, except for
withholding of removal, aliens subject to reinstated removal orders are
“forever deportable” once reentering the United states.131 Also, scholars
argue that sometimes noncitizens are unaware of the fact that they have a
prior order of removal “either because they never received the paperwork or
had their order explained.”132
Considering the above, Justice Breyer concluded that there is no
reasonable explanation why Congress would want to deny bond hearings to
noncitizens in withholding-only proceedings, and by doing so, subject them
to spending a prolonged time in detention facilities.133 While these policy
concerns seem to be well founded, Justice Alito, following a more textualist
approach, brought up a convincing counter-argument, emphasizing that the
text of the statute itself is clear, and the Court cannot disregard the plain
meaning of the statute and turn to statistical data and concerns regarding
practicalities of removal instead.134 Furthermore, based on other statutory
provisions, Congress clearly expressed its general intention to deny the option
of release on bond to detained aliens who are not likely to appear for future
immigration proceedings.135 The Court concluded that Congress’s intent was
to provide different rules for two distinct group of aliens posing different
flight risks, prohibiting the possibility of release on bond for individuals who,
based on their history of having been removed once and then returning to the
country illegally, already proved that they are willing to break the law and
might not comply with immigration orders.136 It makes more sense, therefore,
to conclude that Congress did not intend to allow bond hearings for these high
flight-risk individuals for a reason; namely, to prevent absconding and ensure

alien with written notice, allowing an opportunity to contest the determination, then reinstates the order,
and the alien shall be removed).
130. Koh, supra note 117, at 204-05.
131. Id. at 203, 206.
132. Id. at 206 n.139 (quoting AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, AMERICAN EXILE: RAPID
DEPORTATIONS THAT BYPASS THE COURTROOM 21 (2014)).
133. Guzman Chavez, 141 S. Ct. at 2295 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 2286 (majority opinion).
135. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1236.1(c)(8), 236.1(c)(8). See LEGOMSKY & THRONSON, supra note 91, at 1072
(noting that even when detention is not mandatory, noncitizens can only be released on bond if the
government determines that they are not dangerous to the public and they will likely appear for future
immigration proceedings).
136. Guzman Chavez, 141 S. Ct. at 2290. See also David A. Martin, Graduated Application of
Constitutional Protections for Aliens: The Real Meaning of Zadvydas v Davis, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 79
(2001) (arguing that “the Due Process Clause may implement different levels of protection for different
categories along the alienage-citizenship spectrum”).
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further participation in the removal proceedings, even if it inevitably means
that by law they must face longer detention.137
This raises the question of whether ineligibility for a bond hearing, and,
ultimately, prolonged detention mean that aliens should also fear indefinite
detention as a result. This Note argues that the answer is no.138 While the
Court’s decision in Johnson v. Guzman Chavez closed the door on obtaining
release on bond for detained noncitizens subject to reinstated removal orders
while awaiting the disposition of their withholding applications, another
Supreme Court case, Zadvydas v. Davis, held that post-removal detention
should be no longer than what is “reasonably necessary to bring about that
alien’s removal from the United States,” and created a presumption that such
reasonable time is no longer than six months; after that, if the alien shows that
there is “no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable
future,” and the government is unable to rebut such showing, the alien must
be released from detention.139
By reaffirming the applicability of its holding from Zadvydas v. Davis,
the Court eliminated future due process concerns asserting that restricting
eligibility for bond hearings will subject aliens to indefinite detention, as
aliens detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1231 who are not eligible for bond hearings
can request their release if, after six months of detention, there is no
significant likelihood that they will be removed in the reasonably foreseeable
future. 140 While it does not mean that all aliens are released after six months,
it provides protection against being held for an unreasonably long or
indefinite period of time when removal is unlikely to happen.141 Additionally,
such individuals may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus to challenge
their detention in court; thus, there are other protections available to ensure

137. Guzman Chavez, 141 S. Ct. at 2290. See Legomsky, supra note 103, at 531-41 (discussing
several theories that support the idea of detaining noncitizens in removal proceedings, such as preventing
noncitizens from absconding, protecting the public against possible dangers posed by noncitizens who are
in violation of the immigration laws, and preventing immigration violations. The goal to prevent
absconding by prescribing mandatory detention is especially reasonable in case of noncitizens who have
been ordered removed and a decision on their removability has been made. While mandatory detention
of noncitizens in withholding only proceedings might be harder to reconcile because of their claim that
they fled from persecution, it is not “irrational,” as “[t]he finding of a credible fear surely increases the
probability that the fear in fact is genuine, but it does not increase the probability to one hundred percent.”).
138. Guzman Chavez, 141 S. Ct. at 2287.
139. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. See Martin, supra note 136, at 74 (“After six months, ‘once the
alien provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably
foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.’ Absent
a showing of foreseeable removal, release is required.”) (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701). The Court
extended Zadvydas’s holding to inadmissible noncitizens. LEGOMSKY & THRONSON, supra note 91, at
246 (citing Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005)).
140. Guzman Chavez, 141 S. Ct. at 2287.
141. Id. at 2282.

Published by DigitalCommons@ONU, 2021

19

Ohio Northern University Law Review, Vol. 48 [2021], Iss. 1, Art. 5

168

OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

that the Court’s decision in denying release on bond will not result in
indefinite detention.142
V.

CONCLUSION

As a case of first impression, the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v.
Guzman Chavez resolved a circuit split by holding that aliens subject to
reinstated removal orders are not entitled to bond hearings while pursuing
withholding-only relief.143 The importance of the decision lies in announcing
future policy and precedent for the federal courts confirming the
“administrative” finality of reinstated removal orders to eliminate
inconsistent adjudication of rights and protections during the removal
process.144 Ultimately, there is proper support to argue that the Court
interpreted the relevant statutes to give the most effect to Congress’s intent to
ensure the effectiveness of the removal process by providing more strict rules
for the detention of noncitizens entering the United States illegally in
violation of their prior removal orders, as they already showed willingness to
disregard federal laws and immigration orders.145
Nonetheless, narrowing the eligibility to request bond hearings has
serious real-life consequences, and, even if the Court reaffirmed that
indefinite detention is not permitted, many aliens affected by this decision
will likely be detained for a longer time, possibly until their withholding-only
application is decided.146 Thus, while this note argues that the Court’s
decision stands on solid legal grounds as far as interpreting the meaning of
the text and structure of the statute, when considering its far reaching effects
from a more practical point of view, it is likely that immigration reform
advocates will continue to stress the need for comprehensive legislative
changes to eliminate unresolved ambiguities, including those concerning
reinstated removal orders.
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